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Abstract 
 
This article analyses regulatory innovation. It considers, in particular, how a 
regulatory environmental agency has been encouraged to innovate in the area of 
biopesticides. The literature on regulatory innovation is reviewed, the discussion 
situated within Moran’s theory of the regulatory state.  It considers to what extent 
innovation has occurred within the agency, looking at its pro-active stance, and how 
unusually for a regulatory body it has negotiated new policy spaces in which to 
operate. The article looks at the contextual drivers and also the exogenous and 
endogenous pressures behind the innovation. It shows how the executive has 
intervened in order to promote more use of biopesticides and how pressure is also 
being exerted within the regulatory authority. By using the existing literature and 
empirical evidence a framework is outlined for explaining the likelihood of regulatory 
innovation occurring in regulatory agencies.  
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Introduction 
 
Bureaucrats and regulators are typically risk averse. The desire to avoid things going 
wrong means they are not natural innovators. Risk averseness does not create an 
encouraging environment for regulatory innovation (indeed, the term is almost a 
contradiction). This article uses the example of the Pesticides Safety Directorate’s 
(PSD) work on biopesticides to examine and develop accounts of regulatory 
innovation. PSD is an agency of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), employs 
around 200 scientific, policy and support staff and is responsible for the registration of 
agricultural pesticides. I
 
 They advise Ministers on the development and enforcement 
of pesticide policy and legislation and also on all aspects of pesticides approvals 
policy. Applicants for regulatory approval must submit scientific evidence in the form 
of data packages that follow PSD’s guidelines. The data is evaluated by their 
scientific experts, who in turn prepare reports for consideration by the Advisory 
Committee on Pesticides (ACP). It then advises Ministers on whether the pesticide 
should be authorised for sale and use.   
The article considers to what extent regulatory innovation has occurred within 
the agency.  Furthermore, how and why has this occurred?  To what extent are the 
characteristics of the agency conducive to regulatory change? The article is based on 
research interviews, unstructured discussions in informal settings and observations of 
meetings at PSD.  The literature in regulatory innovation is reviewed and based on 
empirical findings a framework is provided for how innovation may be promoted in 
other regulatory bodies.  At the outset we should stress a methodological point. It is 
often not appropriate to generalise from a case study to other cases; in other words, 
they lack external validity. II
 
 It is difficult (perhaps impossible) to identify typical or 
representative cases; a case study is not a sample of one. The key purpose of this 
method is not one of generalisation in the usual sense, but whether we can effectively 
generate theory out of the findings (Yin, 1989). Therefore, we can use the insights of 
our study to propose a new framework for understanding regulatory innovation in 
regulatory bodies which could then be tested further in subsequent research.  
What are Biopesticides? 
 
Biopesticides are made up of a broad group of agents. They are defined here, as mass 
produced, biologically based agents used for the control of plant pests.  This 
definition includes not only the active ingredient of a biopesticide but also the way it 
is used. III They can be divided into three sub categories (Copping and Menn, 2000): 
(1) living organisms (aka natural enemies), which includes invertebrates (eg: 
predatory insects), nematodes and micro-organisms; (2) naturally occurring 
substances including plant extracts and semiochemicals (eg: insect pheromones); (3) 
in some countries – but not the UK - genetically modified plants that express 
introduced genes that confer protection against pests or diseases (so called plant 
incorporated products) are also classified as biopesticides. In the UK microbial agents 
and naturally occurring substances used as plant protection products are regulated by 
PSD. Non native invertebrates (which include nematodes) included for release in the 
UK are regulated by Defra under advice from ACRE (Advisory Committee on 
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Releases to the Environment). Our main focus is on microbial biopesticides. These 
tend to be applied inundatively, in a way similar to chemical insecticides, but many 
exhibit desirable biologically-based properties. (eg: specificity, reproductive potential, 
low impact on non target organisms, compatibility with other natural enemies, limited 
toxic residue) (Dent 2000).  
 
Why Such a Low Take-Up? 
 
Microbial biopesticides have been commercially available for over twenty years, but 
they ‘represent less than 1% of the global market for agrochemical crop production’ 
(Hajek, 2004, p. 331). Sixty per cent of world sales are derived from commercial 
preparations based on an entomopathogenic bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis 
(Lisansky cited in Ehlers, 2007, p 13). Moreover, there are 60 microbial active 
ingredients available in the USA, compared to EU wide registration for only 6 
products (Hokkanen and Menzler-Hokkanen, 2007, p. 4).    
 
There are various reasons why take up has been higher in the USA. There is 
more institutional support in the form of a dedicated Biopesticides and Pollution 
Division within the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency). There is also more 
external policy support through the Interregional Research Project No 4 (IR-4 Project) 
programme. Generally, however, the take up of biopesticides has been low. One 
explanation is the ‘market failure hypothesis’ In other words, the market size is too 
small to provide economies of scale and encourage firms to enter (see, for example, 
ACP, 2004, pp. 23/4). Given that biopesticides are niche products with very specific 
applications, the market size for any one product is small. A single market operates in 
theory within the European Union (EU) where the existing regulatory arrangements 
can be described as ‘a dual-system where the Community evaluates active substances 
and Member States evaluate and authorise products containing them’ (European 
Commission, 2001, p. 2). The Commission accepts, however, that mutual recognition 
between member states does not work well. Directive 91/414, dealing with such 
issues, is currently under revision and could create a larger market for biopesticides 
and overcome some of the economies of scale problems.  
 
Whilst market failure plays its part, an alternative hypothesis (and the one we 
are concerned with here) is that of regulatory failure. Systems of regulation can have 
unintended consequences. Bureaucratic theory points to a tendency for mechanisms to 
displace goals, for processes to become more important than outcomes (Merton, 
1968). There may be consideration of policy instruments in isolation from their wider 
effects and rules may be applied too rigidly. This is not a specific failure by regulators 
themselves in terms of how they have carried out their jobs. Rather we are referring to 
systemic problems arising in regulation, along with specific problems in the 
regulation of biopesticides. The UK regulatory system was developed according to a 
chemical pesticides model, and this may have acted as a barrier to biopesticide 
commercialisation (Advisory Committee on Pesticides, 2004). Registration fees for 
biologicals (whilst lower than for chemicals) appeared substantial given UK market 
potential and the turnover of a typical R & D micro-business (Pendlington and 
Dickinson, 2003). Companies were also deterred because of the costs of gathering the 
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amount of supporting data that thought they would be required to produce 
(Pendlington and Dickinson, ibid). In short, the system did not facilitate the efficient 
registration of biological alternatives. As Waage has stated, ‘biopesticide 
development is locked into an inflexible and unimaginative chemical pesticide model. 
In this position, all of the shortcomings of biopesticides relative to chemicals emerge 
and none of the benefits’ (Waage, 1997, p. 14). Waage adds:  
 
It is not the industry alone, but the entire pesticide regulatory process which 
has not adapted itself to the new opportunities which biopesticides provide. In 
their emphasis on high efficacy standards typical of fast-acting potent 
chemical products, registration procedures make little allowance for new 
products whose effect is a combination of direct kill and the conservation of 
natural enemies’ (1997, p.16).  
 
To put it another way, there was a potential government failure as the entry costs to 
the market are raised by an onerous registration process designed for chemical 
pesticides (Grant, 2005).  The regulatory system needed reform: hence the topic under 
discussion.   
 
What is Regulatory Innovation? 
 
Models of the regulatory state provide a framework to our discussion. Moran’s work 
is of particular importance here, in terms of developing a model of its essential 
characteristics (2000; 2002; 2003; 2005). New executive agencies are contracted to 
deliver policy; a newly privatized sector is subject to a network of specialized 
regulatory agencies; and government has turned to the specialized regulatory agencies 
to control large areas of economic and social life (Moran, 2005, p. 156). 
 
The main link, however, is with the literature on regulatory innovation. 
Innovation can be seen as ‘the application of new solutions to old problems, or new 
solutions to new (or newly constructed) problems, but not old solutions to old 
problems’ (Black, 2005a, p. 9).  This is illuminated by Hall’s (1993) typology of 
policy change. First order changes are changes to the levels or settings of basic 
instruments (not considered here as innovations). Second-order policy changes 
involve changes in technique, process or instrument, but not in the overall goals of 
policy or understanding on which it is based. Third-order changes involve changes in 
the goals of policy and understandings on which the policy is based, along with 
second and first-order changes. Third-order changes are ‘paradigm shifts’, changes in 
the terms of a policy discourse: the understandings on which it is based and the goals 
pursued (Kuhn 1962).  
 
This paper, like Black, views regulatory innovation as innovation in any 
aspect of the regulatory system or regulatory regime (Black, 2005a). A regulatory 
regime is the set of interrelated units engaged in joint problem solving to address a 
particular goal, its boundaries being defined by the definition of the problem being 
addressed, and it has a degree of continuity over time (Hood et al, 2001). This is a 
wider definition of regulatory innovation than that of Sparrow (innovation in modes 
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of risk regulation: Sparrow 2000) or Moran (innovation in institutional arrangements: 
Moran 2003).  The advantage, however, of using the notion of a regulatory system or 
regime is that it draws attention to both to the range of participants in the system and 
their interrelationship (Black, 2005a). Therefore, regulatory innovation consists of 
innovation in the performance of regulatory functions, institutional structures and 
organizational processes in the regulatory regime (Black, 2005a).  
 
Given that existing actors in the policy network are primarily orientated 
towards chemical solutions, how can change be brought about?  Policy network 
theory suggests that networks are good at managing incremental change, but tend only 
to innovate in conditions of crisis or exogenous shock. This is complicated by the fact 
that the EU has the leading role in pesticides legislation. Its system of decision 
making and inbuilt ‘checks and balances’ does not promote rapid policy change or 
paradigm shifts.  For defenders of the status quo, ‘a sectoral policy network which has 
a high degree of cohesion among its members is a very powerful political resources’ 
(Daubjerg, 1998, p. 79).  As Stringer and Richardson put it, ‘the objective of the 
policy-making process within these communities is often not the solving of real 
problems but the management of the avoidance of conflict, the creation or 
maintenance of stable relationships, and the avoidance of abrupt policy changes’ 
(1982, p. 22). Using the insights of the regulatory innovation literature along with 
interviews we can seek to identify agents and processes that create the conditions 
under which regulatory innovation can occur.  
 
How and Why Does Regulatory Innovation Occur?  
 
The more difficult question is how and why does regulatory innovation occur? The 
literature which specifically refers to innovation is quite narrow. Nevertheless, Black 
divides up the explanations and theories into five ‘worlds’: the worlds of the 
individual, the organization, the state, the global polity and the innovation (Black, 
2005b). In the first world the individual is both the site and agent of innovation. An 
emphasis on champions is found in much of the work in public sector innovation. The 
role of the ‘champion’, a charismatic individual who backs the innovation, is also 
emphasised in studies of innovation within firms. The characteristics of such 
champions are risk preferring, being open to new ideas, persuasive, empathetic and 
occupying key strategic positions within organizations. Generally speaking, such 
individuals will have sufficient financial resources to absorb losses from unprofitable 
innovations, be able to cope with a high degree of uncertainty, and have a favourable 
attitude towards change and risk-taking. In the world of the individual, therefore, 
innovation is explained by one, or sometimes two, key individuals who are able to 
push their performed innovation through critical decision junctures or ‘policy’ 
windows.  This relates to the work of Kingdon (1984) who argued that ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’ take advantage of policy windows offered by the concatenation of 
policy problems, policies and politics to catapult new items onto the political agenda 
and change policy.  
  
The organizational world concentrates on innovations within organizations, 
traditionally profit-making organizations, but increasingly non-profit public and 
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private sector organizations. Innovation is fostered by organizations where the leader 
or leaders have a positive attitude towards change, which have low centralization, 
where its members have a high degree of knowledge and expertise, in which 
procedures are not highly formalized, where there is a high degree of interpersonal 
connections between the organization’s members, and a high degree of organizational 
slack, for example, the extent to which uncommitted resources are available to the 
organization, with the biggest factor being size: ceteris paribus, large organizations 
are more innovative than smaller ones (Rogers, 2003; Mahler and Rogers, 1999). Also 
important are the existence of cultures which are supportive of risk-taking and can 
tolerate mistakes and failures.  
 
The ‘state world’ focuses on government, either taken as an aggregate, or a 
particular unit of government (a local authority, or NHS trust, or a regulatory agency). 
The work on innovation within government comes mainly, as expected, from political 
science. As Black writes, ‘if the question “how and why does innovation in public 
policy occur” is rephrased as “how and why does policy change occur” or “how and 
why does policy learning occur”, then immediately almost any theory of public policy 
formation would have an answer’ (Black, 2005b, p. 25). Public choice theory, for 
example, would state that innovations are political goods which are sold to the highest 
bidder or coalition of bidders, and will depend on the distribution of costs and benefits 
of particular groups. Pluralism would argue that they come about through an interplay 
of interest group pressures. Public Opinion response theory would state that they are 
the result of public pressure, mediated by the media. Rational theories of bureaucracy 
would argue that they are the result of self-interested bureaucratic decisions (Downs, 
1967).    
 
None of these state models, however, allow for the expectation that ‘ministers 
decide’ or at least express a policy preference. Furthermore, there is not always such a 
distinction between change and innovation in the literature as Black suggests (Downs, 
1967, seems to use the terms interchangeably).  That being said, the literature in the 
state world directly associated with ‘innovation’ is rather narrow, and in its casual 
explanations does not provide a particularly rich seam of analysis (Black, 2005b). The 
institutional literature, however, has focused to some extent on innovations, and 
provides a broader set of arguments. Central to ‘new institutionalism’, for example, is 
that ‘institutions matter’ when it comes to individual and social action and interaction 
as they provide the structure to which the action and interaction occurs (March and 
Olsen, 1984). Such an approach suggests that innovation is explained by the impact of 
institutional structures on decision making by political actors, including bureaucrats 
and those in regulatory agencies. The form that regulatory innovations take in 
different regulatory regimes will depend upon the extent to which they ‘fit’ with the 
surrounding institutional environment.  
 
The site of analysis of the ‘global world’ is policy-making by international 
bodies and networks. States have been relatively passive or bypassed in many areas of 
policy development which are nonetheless regulatory in character. Either they are 
willing to be instructed by international organizations or epistemic communities as to 
what action to take IV, or they are bypassed by transnational organizations which set 
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technical or professional standards (Boli and Thomas, 1997). In the ‘world of the 
individual’ an idea is likely to be adopted and enacted  primarily on the shape and 
form of the innovation itself, and for some, on the extent to which it ‘fits’ with the 
prevailing cognitive/normative frameworks. ‘The more the innovation is simply 
expressed, trialable and observable, the more it is expressed as a general theory, and 
the more it fits, or can be represented as fitting, with dominant cognitive and 
normative schemas, the more likely it is the idea or innovation will be adopted’ 
(Black, 2005b, p. 40).  
 
The five worlds are not mutually exclusive and do not exhaust the possible 
range of explanations that may exist. Black can be criticised for trying to cover every 
possible theory or explanation: there is not much differentiation or selection, and 
therefore potentially little leverage. To some extent she acknowledges this, stating 
‘one is inevitably prey to the criticism that what is offered is simply a bewildering 
variety of perspectives or explanations with no clear direction as to which course one 
should take’ (Black, 2005b, p. 41). Black states that her aim is to ‘provide an 
analytical framework for much richer explorations’ (Black, 2005b, p. 41).  
Academia has been criticised for its lack of high quality research on innovation in the 
public sector, particularly of the ‘how was it done’ kind (Cabinet Office, 2003). 
Black’s ‘five worlds’ do not seem to lend themselves to the practice of regulatory 
innovation. The world of the individual and some of the structural and procedural 
aspects of the organizational may provide identifiable tools for action. It is less easy 
to translate the ‘organizational environment’ or ‘institutional structures’ into such 
tools.  The case studies in Black’s edited volume, moreover, show the contingency of 
many accounts of regulatory innovation.  It is concluded that ‘neither the occurrence 
nor the outcomes of innovation can be controlled and predicted’.  ‘Innovation simply 
cannot be engineered’ (Black and Lodge., 2005, p 194).  This article’s stance is that 
whilst it may often come about by chance, agents and processes can be identified 
which are likely to increase the chance of it occurring.  Moreover, in this particular 
case a consideration of the contextual and exogenous and endogenous drivers (whilst 
overlapping with Black’s analysis) may provide a slightly better framework.    
  
Regulatory Innovation within PSD 
 
In June 2003 PSD launched a pilot scheme to encourage the development and 
introduction of alternative control measures. Reduced registration fees were set for the 
purposes of the scheme. PSD also held pre-submission meetings to encourage and 
assist applications for alternative control products. The aim was to increase the 
availability of biological pesticides in the UK by improving knowledge and raising 
awareness of PSD requirements and how to meet them.    
In April 2006 the agency announced the introduction of a permanent 
Biopesticide scheme to facilitate more alternative products to enter the market. The 
key elements of the scheme are: 
• The appointment of a biopesticide champion to provide initial contact for 
product innovators/manufacturers, and help them through the approval 
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process. Their role is also to provide a voice within PSD where issues may 
affect biopesticides. 
• Appointment of ‘Biocontacts’ in each of the specialist areas of risk assessment 
to provide guidance on specific scientific and regulatory issues. 
• Encouraging potential applicants to meet with PSD at the earliest possible 
stages of product development. 
• The provision of specific guidance to applicants (via free pre-submission 
meetings) flagging up possible hurdles to address and identifying the best way 
forward for their product.  
• The provision of more accessible information on the regulatory process with a 
new Biopesticide area on their website. 
• A fee for evaluations approximately a quarter of the cost of a conventional 
pesticide. 
The functions of the scheme can be summarised as follows. Firstly, they seek 
to reassure developers of new products that the regulator is receptive to products 
other than synthetic pesticides. Secondly, they seek to facilitate the successful 
completion of the regulatory process by providing advice and assistance on 
requirements. Thirdly, they seek to reduce the cost of regulation by setting fees at a 
lower level. Prior to the introduction of the scheme, three actives and four products 
had been approved between 1985 and 1997.V  Since the introduction of the pilot 
scheme, five biopesticide products have been guided through the system and approved 
for use in the UK. Five other products are at various stages of evaluation and a large 
number of companies are discussing possible applications (PSD, 2007, p. 19).VI
 
 PSD 
were told by the biopesticide industry that if they reformed the ‘floodgates would 
open’ - that there were a large number of products waiting to be registered.  Whilst 
this has not happened outcomes have been favourable compared to the preceding 
period.  The organization has undergone an internal reorientation in seeking to 
proactively facilitate biopesticides registrations. They stress their ‘pragmatism’ and 
that the rules are ‘open to interpretation’. An example is the encouragement of the use 
of published data instead of requiring expensive and lengthy field trials where 
appropriate in the approvals process. They acknowledge the need to innovate and 
have familiarized themselves with the fact that different questions have to be asked 
about biological products, and that questions that may be important for synthetics are 
not necessarily relevant for biologicals.  
Does, however, this change count as innovation?  To return to Hall’s typology, 
some aspects of the biopesticides scheme may count as first order policy changes (eg: 
lower fees for biologicals). Most, however, fall comfortably within the category of 
second order policy changes (eg: a biopesticides champion, pre-submission meetings 
etc).  In some ways lower fees are the biggest change but, as Black suggests, first 
order changes may be significant in terms of scale or impact whilst not strictly 
counting as innovation (Black, 2005a). One hypothesis is that we are moving away 
from a (chemical) pesticides paradigm to an ecological pest management paradigm – 
if so, it may even be appropriate to talk of third order policy changes. VII It is 
important to consider the scheme as a whole - it is the broader point that is of more 
interest rather than trying to map on to the minutiae of the scheme. We should, 
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however, distinguish formal aspects of the scheme (eg: reduced fees) from what has 
come about as a result of the scheme (eg: PSD stressing their more pragmatic stance). 
Taking everything together, we can describe what has occurred as regulatory 
innovation. To return to Black, it has involved ‘new solutions’ (Black, 2005a). It is an 
unusual step for a regulatory agency which usually has to stick closely to what is laid 
down in statute to negotiate new policy spaces in which to operate (which is 
effectively what has happened here).  PSD sought clearance from Defra, particularly 
in relation to the funding of the scheme (a point we return to below), thereby creating 
a new space in which to take action. Arguably, this has extended their formal remit, 
albeit cleared by ministers. As Richard Davis, their Director of Approvals puts it, this 
has been ‘quite remarkable for a regulatory agency’ (Sainsbury’s Conference, 18th 
March 2008). VIII There is a view within PSD that the capacity for regulatory 
innovation is limited as legislation would often be needed and that, particularly at the 
European level, it is a protracted process over which PSD has little influence. IX
 
.  A 
degree of regulatory innovation has successfully occurred, however, and continues to 
be developed on the basis of experience.  
Contextual Drivers 
 
It is helpful to look at the contextual drivers. In the chapter ‘The Background and the 
Need for Change’ (www.pesticides.gov.uk/garden.asp?id=1523, accessed 12th March, 
2007), from the document ‘A Draft National Strategy for the Sustainable Use of Plant 
Protection Products’, PSD talk of various drivers for change in the ways in which 
plant protection products are regulated and used and some of these are relevant to our 
discussion.    
 
Firstly, the public are concerned about the possible health effects of pesticide 
residues on food. Pesticide residues are regulated in the EU by Maximum Residue 
Levels (MRLs) which provide substantial margins of safety to deal with a worst case 
scenario.  Nevertheless, many Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) point to 
what they see as the harmful effects of pesticides on human health (picked up in 
popular literature by authors such as Humphreys, 2001).  Secondly, there is consumer 
preference, even when there are no safety concerns, for a reduction in pesticide 
residues in food, leading to action by retailers, consumers and the Food Standards 
Agency. From a food policy perspective, pesticide residues on fresh foods are a 
concern as they may deter consumers from eating fruit and vegetables which are 
thought to be desirable in terms of preventive health (biopesticides are much less 
likely to have such residue problems) Retailers often push for levels of pesticide 
reduction more rigorous than those required by regulators, which in themselves are 
very stringent. There is also a requirement to integrate chemical pesticides with 
alternative methods in order to develop systems of crop protection which are 
sustainable. This has an ecological dimension; crops need to be protected using 
methods which do not damage the environment, in particular in terms of water 
pollution and biodiversity. Public concern over the impact of pesticides on the 
environment, therefore, is a third driver of change. Broad spectrum synthetic 
pesticides can reduce populations of beneficial, naturally occurring predators and 
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parasitoids (that being said, generations are now available which have a narrow 
spectrum of activity and good environmental characteristics).   
 
Pesticides are also required which prevent the development of resistance by 
the pest to the control agent. Following the implementation of European Directive 
91/414/EEC there has been a significant decline in the number of active ingredients 
permitted for use in crop protection products. Moreover, because of the expense of 
research and registration, manufacturers are unlikely to develop new chemical 
products on a large scale. These are further drivers of change. As there has been a 
reduction in the number of pesticide products available for use, this increases the 
problem of pesticide resistance. When an effective pesticide is applied to a crop and 
the majority of the pest population dies ‘sometimes a few individuals remain that are 
physiologically different and can tolerate the pesticide. The “new strain” of the pest 
that has been created is resistant to the pesticide and the population can then increase 
even when the pesticide is re-applied’ (Hajek, 2004). The broad solution is to use 
IPM. ‘There is a role for chemical pesticides in IPM when infestations cannot be 
controlled by any other means, but they should be used as a last rather than as a first 
resort. There is also scope for increased use of alternatives to chemical pesticides such 
as biological controls and in particular biopesticides’ (Grant, 2005, p. 10).  
 
Proximate Drivers: Exogenous and Endogenous Pressures 
 
We can now move onto the proximate drivers, and within this separate out 
analytically the exogenous and endogenous pressures for change. The intervention of 
the executive is an example of the former. Defra has been keen to encourage the wider 
use of biopesticides (in order to achieve sustainability objectives).X
 
 Given the slow 
progress being made, the institutions of the core executive needed to intervene in the 
policy-making process. The then Business Regulation Team (BRT) of the Regulatory 
Impact Unit of the Cabinet Office discovered in 2002 that, ‘although Defra had been 
funding the research and development of ‘alternatives’ to synthetic pesticides, none 
had been able to obtain the authorisation required for such products to be placed for 
sale in the UK as plant protection products’. They observed that PSD’s testing 
requirements ‘were evidently designed to cope with standard, mass- produced 
synthetic chemical pesticides which, by their nature, tend to deliver very high efficacy 
rates, and not with this group of safer alternatives…..this appeared to be an interesting 
example of regulation-inspired market failure’ (Business Regulation Team, 2003, p. 
19).  
In the coded language of the civil service, ‘the BRT approached PSD in order 
to seek a solution to the problem’. In Grant’s words, ‘they used their authority to lean 
on PSD’ (Grant, 2005, p. 15). The fact that the Government leaned on PSD was 
confirmed both by a senior figure within PSD and by an industrial executive seconded 
to BRT to work on biopesticides.  Richard Davis, commented that ‘there was a 
political driver but it wasn’t Defra or growers, it was the Cabinet Office’. 
Furthermore, ‘it was someone on secondment to the Cabinet Office, not a career civil 
servant’ (Biopesticides Workshop, 31st October 2007). XI As Davis suggests, ‘we did 
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need some pressure to introduce the scheme. He gave us a kick in the teeth’ 
(REBECA Conference, Sept 20/21 2007). XII
 
 PSD’s ‘aims and objectives’, agreed 
with ministers in spring 2003, included reducing the ‘negative impact of pesticides by 
encouraging reductions in their use, taking account of good practice, and developing 
and introducing alternative control measures’ (PSD, 2004, p 9). Pressure from the 
Cabinet Office has worked alongside an endogenous steer from within PSD. They 
were keen to discuss how the new aim could be promoted (Business Regulation 
Team, 2003). As Davis put it, as a ‘typical regulator’ they took a stand but ‘bowed’ to 
government pressure, accepting that change was necessary (Biopesticides workshop, 
31st October 2007).  The Director of Policy and the Director of Approvals made the 
joint decision to have a pilot scheme. Defra provided money to allow reduced fees for 
biopesticides but only on a temporary basis. The Director of Approvals decided to 
make the Biopesticides Scheme permanent; thereby confirming that key individuals 
were vital in moving the process forward.   
Not all aspects of PSD necessarily promote innovation. One grower, for 
example, put it that the agency has an attitude of ‘we would like to do that, but we 
can’t. (They) are civil servants that regulate, they cover their backs’ (interview, 25th 
May, 2005). A senior PSD official, meanwhile, commented that there is ‘a danger in 
any technical body that that it follows an almost separate set of objectives or a more 
limited set of objectives. Not saying “What does the Minister want”?  “What would 
be politically acceptable’? “How is it going to look in the Sun”? (interview, 28th 
November 2007). To put it another way, a technical body may be more resistant to the 
political pressures which can help push through change. A respondent from a 
stakeholder organization suggested that PSD are a ‘technical regulator’, as opposed to 
a more political regulator like the Environment Agency. He added that ‘technical 
regulators have to be a lot more old school. There is an administrative culture there (at 
PSD) and it doesn’t look dynamic....PSD have to have a technical dialogue with 
people with a technical bent’. However, whilst it does ‘not have a very glossy public 
persona (they) can be innovative when they are allowed to be’ (meeting, 7th October, 
2005).  
 
A respondent from an environmental group pointed to ‘big flaws in ways in 
which they work and operate…part of the problem is the bureaucracy involved. They 
take a policy steer from Defra, there’s a time lag on it, and lots of inertia... they follow 
the recipe, but who’s checking the recipe to make sure it’s the right one? (interview, 
26th October, 2005).  Our interviews and observations, however, reveal that Defra has 
a fairly ‘hands off’ relationship with PSD. This is in part due to them being an 
‘executive agency’ as opposed to part of the traditional civil service. Defra are also 
aware that pesticide issues are highly technical and this lack of knowledge may make 
them wary of intervening. They may also prefer to keep themselves distant, so that if 
anything goes wrong PSD will take the flak. XIII The minister responsible for 
pesticides policy, Phil Woolas, commented at an open meeting of the ACP that, ‘It’s 
an area of public service if it gets in the news, it tends to be negative. As an elected 
politician one wants to keep it out of the news. It is not an easy area of government 
policy’ (12th November, 2007). Exogenous pressure from government, therefore, 
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promotes regulatory innovation, but relative autonomy from Defra (perhaps 
reinforced by PSD’s location in York) provides space for it to occur. This 
decentralisation from their political masters explains how whilst government needed 
to provide an initial exogenous shock to promote alternatives, innovation has been 
sustained within the agency.   
 
It is also important to look at how work is allocated. We observed the 
approvals process being started by three resource managers with an initiation meeting.  
This, alongside the fact that the approval process has to integrate a number of 
different specialisms (a large number of individuals were brought into pre-submission 
meetings), shows that it is a relatively horizontal process. This, in comparison to a 
vertical structure, is more favourable to innovation as individuals have an opportunity 
to ‘bounce ideas’ off their colleagues and learn from different specialists. Richard 
Davis has stressed the importance of an effective and strong team in driving through 
change (Biopesticides workshop, 31st October 2007).  Certainly, those working on 
biopesticides have shown great enthusiasm for their work,  perhaps because of a 
desire to do a ‘better job’, or gain skills or expertise, or doing the job well is a 
successful career building strategy (see Downs, 1967). A senior official commented 
that they were ‘lucky in the people they had picked to work on biopesticides, if others 
had been chosen it may not have worked so well’ (unstructured discussion, October 
31st 2007). Those within approvals also see themselves as scientists first and as 
regulators second: or, in other words, ‘scientific regulators’. They are keen to extend 
their scientific expertise and have shown an interest in learning about biological 
alternatives (eg: through REBECCA XIV
There is a difference between Downs (1967), who argues that change is easier 
to drive through in smaller organizations (the more individuals affected the more 
difficult it will be to push it through), and some of the literature on organizations that 
suggests it is easier in larger organizations (due to uncommitted resources and 
organizational slack) (eg: Rogers, 2003; Mahr and Rogers, 1999). Organizational 
slack in larger bureaucracies could lead to projects which take up a lot of time but do 
not get very far.  Moreover, staff may be more ‘accountable’ for their actions in 
smaller organizations; in other words it is easier to see who is performing their jobs 
well.  Effective working relationships and a high degree of interpersonal connections 
exist within the approvals side of PSD (linking back to Black, 2005b, p.20); its ‘close-
knit’ nature fostered by its size. On balance, therefore, the relatively small size of the 
organization and its clear purpose are likely to be conducive to regulatory innovation.  
PSD was also set up, on the approvals side, as a fee generator agency (in other words, 
there are commercial elements to the agency).  As they have to cover their costs (at 
least in part) through registration fees they are different to many government 
bureaucracies. 
). This knowledge is driving regulatory 
innovation forward (linking back to Black, 2005b, p. 20), with pre-submission 
meeting in particular allowing PSD to build up their expertise and develop a more 
appropriate registration process. As Davis puts it, ‘they have built a team of 
specialists who understand the issues and are continuing to learn’ (Sainsbury’s 
Conference, 18th March 2008).   
XV These financial pressures may make the organization more flexible 
and innovative: after all, there are consequences if they do not succeed in gaining an 
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adequate income.  Given, however, that they have to cover their costs there are limits 
to how far they can go in terms of lower registration fees.  As a senior official within 
PSD put it, ‘Biopesticides run counter to what the agency needs which is more money 
in from pesticides’ (interview, 28th  November 2007). Commercial pressures in this 
instance, therefore, may not be helping the promotion of alternatives.   
 
A ‘Champion’ Organization?  
 
We have seen how the literature refers to ‘champions’ who push through innovations 
(Black, 2005, pp. 17-19). The role of the (part-time) Biopesticides Champion within 
PSD is to assist biologicals through the registration process, rather than be a champion 
in the stronger sense of the word.  There is, moreover, a gap in the literature when it 
comes to ‘champion organizations’. One argument is that an organization, preferably 
quasi-governmental in character and acting as an advocate for biopesticides, would 
lead (and have led) to greater regulatory change. EPA, as noted earlier, has a 
dedicated Biopesticides and Pollution Prevention Division (BPPD) taking on an 
advocacy role. The size of the US domestic market offers a lot of opportunities for 
biopesticides; a dedicated unit in the UK may have insufficient work to do.  
 
How would an advocacy role, moreover, fit into the overall role of PSD? Its 
website states that ‘the aim of PSD is to protect the health of human beings, creatures 
and plants, safeguard the environment and secure safe, efficient and humane methods 
of pest control, by controlling the sale, supply, storage, advertisement and use of 
pesticides’ (http://www.pesticides.gov.uk/corporate.asp?id=232, accessed  9/10/07). 
As part of the strategy for sustainable food and farming, meanwhile, it is tasked with 
reducing negative impacts of pesticides on the environment. It could approach this 
task by promoting the wider use of biopesticides but this would require ministerial 
guidance. The approvals side of PSD, moreover, is set up to undertake the task of 
registration to ensure the safe use of pesticides. It is debatable whether it is equipped 
to take on an advocacy role. As Richard Davis put it, ‘my challenge is to promote the 
scheme, not to promote biopesticides, there is a difference’ (Biopesticides workshop, 
21st October 2007). Another option would be for an organization such as Natural 
England (http://www.naturalengland.org.uk) to become a champion.  When asked if 
they could act as an advocate, however, they responded that it couldn’t be ‘a 
categorical decision that they’re better, they are not always better.  Historical data 
base shows that some biological control mechanisms can create environmental 
problems’. Without a champion organization, however, the case for biopesticides 
risks being sidelined.   
 
Reform of Institutional Structures 
 
As a new institutionalist would claim, the structure of institutions shapes how people 
act within them. The UK Royal Commission on Environmental Protection (RCEP) 
report on Crop Spraying and the Health of Residents and Bystanders (2005) 
recommended that responsibility for pesticides policy be separate from that of the 
approval of pesticides. One suggestion was to move the policy function from the PSD 
to a unit within the Environment Directorate of Defra. The Report adds that the 
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remaining functions concerned with the approval of pesticides could be transferred to 
the Environment Agency.  This could change the focus of PSD’s work to 
environmental impact which may be even more costly than demonstrating efficacy. 
The transfer of policy functions to Defra, meanwhile (making it more of a technical 
regulator), could make PSD less amenable to change.  ACP’s response (2005) to the 
RCEP Report stated: 
 
We ……. emphasise the need, when making decisions in this area, to take into 
account the current excellence of the scientific and technical staff at PSD. In 
our view, their performance is as strong as that of the best government 
departments and agencies, and ahead of the majority. It also compares 
favourably with that of pesticide regulatory agencies in other European 
countries. We believe it would be most unfortunate if a reorganization caused 
this valuable concentration of expertise to be lost (ACP, 2005, p. 33).  
 
The Hampton Review on UK regulation set up by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, reported in April 2005, and proposed streamlining the regulatory structure 
on the grounds that there were too many small regulators. Whilst the report did not 
make a specific recommendation regarding PSD, which was on the cusp as far as size 
was concerned, the implication could be drawn that it should be merged into a larger 
more thematic regulator. Defra, therefore, launched a formal consultation on merging 
PSD with the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), linking to the latter’s existing 
responsibilities for biocides and REACH. XVI
 
 Following this, Ministers decided the 
organizations should be merged from 1 April 2008.  The merger may lead to a greater 
emphasis on bystander and worker protection issues, making it even more difficult to 
secure the timely registration of innovative products that serve sustainability 
objectives.  There is also a risk that a greater focus on chemicals strategy within the 
merged organization might lead to less attention being placed on biological 
alternatives.  It is noticeable, for example, that biopesticides were not mentioned in 
the proposition for the merger. Despite the thinking behind Hampton, a relatively 
small organization may be more flexible and responsive. It may be better able to 
develop an organizational culture favouring innovative responses to new challenges. 
Furthermore, a body with a clear and specific purpose may be more conducive to 
regulatory innovation than a larger and potentially more unwieldy one.   
Conclusions 
 
Regulatory innovation has successfully occurred in the area of biopesticides.  A 
chemically driven regulatory model has been replaced by a modified model more 
adapted to the specific needs of biological control agents, leading to a partial 
resolution of ‘regulatory failure’ problems. In terms of Black’s five worlds’, key 
individuals have been vital in driving the process forward, both within the Cabinet 
Office and PSD.  Similarly, organizational characteristics have played a role (eg: the 
horizontal distribution of work, the desire for knowledge, interpersonal connections 
etc). Moreover, the intervention of the Cabinet Office (‘the state world’) along with 
the impact of institutions should not be understated. Although the ‘global world’ is 
less significant, PSD operates within OECD guidelines, has engaged with REBECA, 
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and the review of 91/144 is potentially important. In terms of the ‘world of the 
innovation’, biopesticides fit into their surrounding environment, not least in terms of 
issues surrounding sustainability, pesticide resistance and the limited number of 
products. They are not, however, an ‘idea’ easy to get to grips with or widely 
understood.  
 
Black’s worlds provide an interesting starting point. Similarly, regulatory 
innovation can be explained through a consideration of the contextual and proximate 
drivers, and exogenous and endogenous pressures. We need, however, a more detailed 
framework for understanding innovation in a regulatory agency. The purpose is not to 
contradict or refute Black’s analysis but to develop and expand it. Black’s framework 
is broad enough to account for most instances of regulatory innovation (some may 
argue it is too vague), but we should be more specific when looking at a particular 
area.  Based on our research a framework or model is proposed whereby the 
likelihood of regulatory innovation occurring in a regulatory agency, all things being 
equal, is increased by:  
 
• Exogenous pressure from central government.  
• Key individuals within the organization being prepared to drive through 
change. 
• Political as opposed to technical regulators. 
• A degree of autonomy from government providing space for innovation to 
occur. 
• A horizontal distribution of work. 
• Selecting the right individuals to work on innovative projects.  
• Regulators keen to learn and develop their expertise (in particular scientific 
regulators). 
• Small organizations (with a clearly defined purpose). 
• Commercial or financial pressures. 
• An organizational champion or advocate. 
 
As stated at the outset there are difficulties in generalising our findings. 
Nevertheless, the framework proposed can be applied more widely as an analytical 
tool.  Research of other regulatory agencies, moreover, could help strengthen the 
external validity of the framework. Regulatory innovation in biopesticides regulation 
is not helped by the relatively weak policy network. The industry is (economically) 
weak, largely consists of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs), is still 
undergoing organizational development, and does not have the policy resources of the 
agrochemical industry. Environmental groups are often fairly isolated from the debate 
and the IBMA (International Biocontrol Manufacturers Association), whilst 
developing in terms of organizational effectiveness, often lacks the resources to carry 
out its role. The drivers for change have tended not to be growers, retailers or 
manufacturers. Similarly, whilst the public may be concerned about pesticide residues 
they are not well informed on biological alternatives (and may be put off by the term 
‘biopesticides’). Further research would be helpful on public opinion, perhaps through 
the use of focus groups or citizen’s juries. Biopesticides tend also not to have a high 
profile among political decision makers. Any framework for understanding the 
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potential for regulatory innovation in a regulatory agency, therefore, should also take 
account of: 
 
• how developed the policy networks are in the particular area. 
• how salient the issue is among the public. 
• how high a profile the issue has amongst politicians.  
 
In terms of the regulatory state model the priority given to regulation sets up 
expectations of innovation and responsiveness to societal demands which can be hard 
to meet in practice. In relation to regulatory innovation frameworks there is a 
fundamental tension between expectations that regulators will be consistent, 
predictable and impartial, and yet also innovative. The consequences of making a 
mistake are serious, especially where public safety/environmental protection is 
involved, but regulators also have to respond to changing demands in society. 
Regulatory innovation is important, moreover, if regulators are to retain the trust of 
politicians and stakeholders.  This paper offers an example of successful regulatory 
innovation in practice. It has required a government steer, appropriate contextual 
circumstances, and a positive response from the agency based upon suitable 
individuals and the right organizational and institutional characteristics.   
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ENDNOTES 
 
 
                                                 
I  PSD was formerly an agency of Defra (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs). Defra 
Ministers remain responsible for pesticides policy.  
II There are some exceptions. See Flyvjerg (2006) for a very helpful analysis.   
III This approach to defining biopesticides is taken from ‘Biopesticides: The Way Ahead’, a briefing 
article for a Conference held at the Royal Agricultural Society of England, Stoneleigh Park, 
Warwickshire, in October 2006.  
IV Epistemic communities are knowledge-based communities with an authoritative claim to policy-
relevant knowledge within their domain of expertise.  
V Email correspondence with Lisa Moakes, Biopesticides Champion, 26th April 2007.  
VI The PSD Annual Report (2007) refers to 4 products having gone through the schemes. The figure 
quoted in the text is an updated figure, confirmed by Lisa Moakes via email, 30th October 2007. 
VII This is the subject of a PhD thesis, see 
http://www.city.ac.uk/hmfp/dps/David%20Buffin%20PhD.pdf  
VIII This was a Conference on Biopesticides and IPM.  
IX Workshop at PSD attended by Wyn Grant, 4th April 2007, at which he gave a lecture on ‘The 
Regulatory Challenge’.  
X The Government’s Sustainable Development website can be found at http://www.sustainable-
development.gov.uk/what/index.htm. It defines sustainable development as “'development which meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs' 
XI This was held at Warwick HRI – more information at 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/biopesticides/events   
XII Held in Brussels, the Conference was entitled ‘Balanced Regulation for Biological Plant Protection’.  
XIII At the PSD workshop, 4th April 2007 it was suggested that Defra may prefer some distance as 
pesticides are seen as ‘nasty’.  
XIV Regulation of Environmental Biological Control Agents 
XV The agency’s approval costs are financed through the payment of fees for evaluation of specific 
pesticide approvals applications and an annual levy which is based on annual turnover of approved 
pesticide products and is charged to the chemical industry.  
XVI REACH was adopted in Dec 2006 by the Council of Environment Ministers and aims to improve 
the protection of the environment and human health through earlier and better identification of the 
properties of chemical substances.  
